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Abstract—Deep neural networks represent the state of the art
in machine learning in a growing number of fields, including
vision, speech and natural language processing. However, recent
work raises important questions about the robustness of such
architectures, by showing that it is possible to induce classification
errors through tiny, almost imperceptible, perturbations. Vulner-
ability to such “adversarial attacks”, or “adversarial examples”,
has been conjectured to be due to the excessive linearity of deep
networks. In this paper, we study this phenomenon in the setting
of a linear classifier, and show that it is possible to exploit sparsity
in natural data to combat `∞-bounded adversarial perturbations.
Specifically, we demonstrate the efficacy of a sparsifying front
end via an ensemble averaged analysis, and experimental results
for the MNIST handwritten digit database. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to show that sparsity provides a
theoretically rigorous framework for defense against adversarial
attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent work in machine learning security points out the
vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial pertur-
bations [1–4]. These perturbations can be designed to be
barely noticeable to the human eye, but can cause large
classification errors in state of the art deep networks. While it
is tempting to speculate that this vulnerability arises from the
complex, nonlinear nature of deep networks, a more plausible
explanation is that it is due to the excessive linearity of such
networks [3–6]. When we take a linear combination of the
components of a high-dimensional input, small, adversarially
chosen, perturbations of each component can add up to a
large perturbation at the output. Complex operations such
as a rectified linear unit (ReLU) operating beyond its bias,
or a sigmoid in its linear region, together with operations
such as max pooling or average pooling, when cascaded
through multiple stages, still amount to an approximately
linear combination of the input. Of course, the coefficients of
the linear combination exhibit some dependence on the input,
but these can be viewed as on-off switches rather than a change
in the value of the coefficients: for example, whether the input
is such that a ReLU unit is operating in its linear region, or
the identity of the argument of the maximum in a max pooling
unit. This motivates us to take a step back in this paper, and
study adversarial perturbations in the simplest possible setting:
a linear classifier.
Sparsity is an intuitively plausible mechanism: we under-
stand that humans reject small perturbations by focusing on the
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key features that stand out. Our proposed approach is based on
this intuition. In this paper we show via both theoretical results
and experiments that a sparsity-based defense is effective
against `∞-bounded perturbations.
We consider a system consisting of a linear classifier and
two participants: the adversary and the defender. The adversary
perturbs the input data, with the goal of causing misclassifica-
tion. The defender inserts a pre-processing function in order
to attenuate the impact of the adversary. We propose a spar-
sifying front end as the preprocessing function and evaluate
its performance in two scenarios: a “semi-white box” setting
where the adversary designs the perturbation based on the
linear model, but without accounting for the pre-processing,
and a “white box” setting where the attack accounts for both
the pre-processing function and the classifier.
Contributions: We develop a theoretical framework to as-
sess and demonstrate the effectiveness of a sparsity-based de-
fense against adversarial attacks. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work to show that sparsity provides a rigorous
foundation for defense against adversarial perturbations. Our
main contributions in this paper are as follows:
• We quantify the achievable gain of the sparsity-based
defense via an ensemble-averaged analysis based on a
stochastic model for the linear classifier. As the main the-
oretical contribution of the paper, in Theorems 1 and 2 we
show that with high probability, sparsity-based defense
reduces the adversarial impact by a factor of K/N in
the semi-white box setting, and by O(K polylog(N)/N)
in the white box setting, where K is the sparsity of the
signal, and N is the signal’s dimension.
• We demonstrate the robustness of our proposed defense
through experimental results for binary classification
using a linear SVM on the MNIST handwritten digit
database. Small adversarial perturbations can render such
a classifier useless (0% accuracy), but our sparsity-
based defense limits the damage to 1-4% degradation
in accuracy for the semi-white and white box attacks,
respectively.
II. RELATED WORK
The existence of “blind spots” in deep neural networks [1]
has been the subject of extensive recent study in machine
learning literature [2]. It was initially hypothesized that this
phenomenon is due to the high complexity of neural networks,
but work on linearization-based attacks [3, 4] and decision
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boundaries of deep networks [5, 6] indicates that it is instead
due to their excessive linearity. A variety of defenses have
been proposed to combat adversarial attacks, including some
that implicitly make use of sparsity-related techniques [7, 8].
The evaluations in such prior work have been purely empirical.
Our analytical framework supplements these by providing a
theoretical justification for systematic and explicit pursuit of
sparsity-based defenses. It is worth noting that sparsity has also
been suggested purely as a means of improving classification
performance [9], which indicates that the performance penalty
for appropriately designed sparsity-based defenses could be
minimal.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Preliminaries
We denote by x ∈ RN a data sample with K-sparse
representation in orthonormal basis Ψ ( = [ψ1,ψ2, . . . ,ψN ] ):∥∥ΨTx∥∥
0
≤ K (K  N).
Given a linear model w ∈ RN , and denoting by xˆ a modified
data sample, we define performance measure ∆:
∆(x, xˆ) = |wT xˆ−wTx|.
B. System Model
Now we describe our system (depicted in Fig. 1) composed
of two blocks, the adversary and the defense:
x +
e
f(·) wT wT xˆ
Adversary Defense
x¯ xˆ
Fig. 1. Block diagram of the system.
− The adversary induces an `∞-bounded additive perturba-
tion e ∈ RN to data x, with the goal of maximizing ∆:
max
e
∆(x, xˆ)
s.t. ‖e‖∞ < .
− The defense adds a pre-processing function f : RN →
RN to the linear model w, with the goal of minimizing
∆.
IV. SPARSITY-BASED DEFENSE
A. Pre-processing Function
Given a linear classifier, we propose a pre-processing func-
tion via a sparsifying front end to combat adversarial attacks.
Figure 2 shows a block diagram of our model, composed of
sparsity-based preprocessing and a linear machine learning
model wT . Function HK(·) enforces sparsity by retaining the
K coefficients largest in magnitude and zeroing out the rest.
Since x is K-sparse in orthonormal basis Ψ, we note that
xˆ = x when there is no attack (e = 0).
We define the following quantities:
SK(x) , supp
(HK(ΨTx)),
PK(e,x) ,
∑
k∈SK(x)
ψkψ
T
k e,
where SK(x) is the support of the K-sparse representation
of x, and PK(e,x) is the projection of e on the subspace
spanned by SK(x).
x +
e
ΨT HK(·) Ψ wT wT xˆ
Sparsifying front end
xˆ
Fig. 2. Block diagram of sparsity-based defense
We also define the high SNR regime as the operating
region where the additive perturbation does not shift the K-
dimensional subspace of x:
SK(x) = SK(x+ e). (1)
In Section V, Proposition 1, we characterize the conditions
that guarantee (1). Now assuming that we operate in the high
SNR regime, we get
HK
(
ΨT (x+ e)
)
= HK
(
ΨTx
)
+ e¯ = ΨTx+ e¯,
where
e¯k =
{
ψTk e, if k ∈ SK(x)
0, otherwise.
The output of the pre-processing function thus becomes
xˆ = x+
∑
k∈SK(x)
ψkψ
T
k e = x+ PK(e,x).
Therefore, the performance measure or adversarial attack’s
impact will be
∆ =
∣∣wT xˆ−wTx∣∣ = ∣∣wT PK(e,x)∣∣
=
∣∣eT PK(w,x)∣∣, (2)
where (2) follows directly from the definition of PK(e,x).
B. Attacks and defenses
We now compare the robustness of both the plain classifier
and our proposed model against various attacks designed based
on partial/full knowledge of the defense.
1. No front end: Here the perturbed data is directly input to
the ML classifier, i.e, ∆0 =
∣∣wTe∣∣. We use this scenario
as a baseline to assess the efficacy of our defense.
Assuming the adversary has knowledge of w, the most
effective attack would be in the direction orthogonal to the
classifier’s decision boundary, subject to the `∞ constraint:
e =  sgn(w).
This yields
∆0 =  ‖w‖1.
2. Semi-white box attack: In this scenario the defender em-
ploys the sparsifying front end, but the adversary designs
the perturbation based on knowledge of w alone. Hence
the perturbation remains
eSW =  sgn(w).
Using (2), we get the impact of the attack as follows:
∆SW = 
∣∣sgn(wT )PK(w,x)∣∣.
3. White box attack: Here the adversary has knowledge
of both w and the front end, and designs perturbations
accordingly. This results in the following optimization
problem:
max
e
∣∣eT PK(w,x)∣∣
s.t. ‖e‖∞ < .
The optimal perturbation is
eW =  sgn(PK(w,x)),
and its impact becomes
∆W =  ‖PK(w,x)‖1.
Thus, instead of aligning with w, eW is aligned to the
projection of w on the subspace that x lies in.
V. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
A. Characterizing the High SNR Regime
Proposition 1. For sparsity level K, the sparsifying front end
preserves the input coefficients if the following SNR condition
holds:
SNR , λ

> 2M,
where λ is the magnitude of the smallest non-zero entry of
HK(ΨTx) and M = maxl ‖ψl‖1.
Proof. It is easy to see that (1) is equivalent to
min
i∈SK(x)
∣∣ψTi (x+ e)∣∣ > max
j /∈SK(x)
∣∣ψTj (x+ e)∣∣ = max
j /∈SK(x)
∣∣ψTj e∣∣,
where the equality follows from the definition of SK(·).
Denoting the optimal indices by i0 and j0, we use triangle
inequality to obtain |ψTi0x| > |ψ
T
i0
e|+|ψTj0e|. The proposition
follows by applying Hölder’s inequality and using the `∞-
bound on e.
Remarks.
1. The SNR condition is easier to satisfy for bases with
sparser, or more localized, basis functions (smaller M ).
For example, we expect a wavelet basis to be better than
a DCT basis.
2. When x is approximately K-sparse, choosing smaller K
allows the SNR condition to hold for larger perturbations,
but at the expense of higher signal perturbation. These
must be traded off to optimize classification performance.
All of our subsequent analysis in this section is based on the
assumption that the SNR condition in Proposition 1 holds. In
this case, the sparsifying front end is signal-preserving, hence
the output distortion can be quantified solely by analyzing its
effect on the adversarial perturbation. In our experiments with
MNIST data, we find that the SNR condition is approximately
satisfied for the range of K that works most effectively (1-5%
of the coefficients in a wavelet basis).
B. Ensemble Averaged Performance
We now provide an analysis that quantifies the robustness
provided by sparsification over an ensemble of linear classi-
fiers, by imposing a stochastic model for w.
Assumption. For w = (w1, . . . , wN )
T , we model the {wi, i =
1, . . . , N} as i.i.d., with zero mean and median: E[w1] = 0
and E[sgn(w1)] = 0. Let E[|w1|] = µ and E
[
w21
]
= σ2.
1) Semi-White Box Attack
Theorem 1. As K approaches infinity, ∆SW/K converges to
µ in probability, i.e.
lim
K→∞
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∆SWK − µ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ) = 1 ∀ δ > 0.
Remark. After sparsification, the impact ∆SW of the adversar-
ial perturbation scales linearly with the sparsity level K. Thus,
the sparsifying front end provides an attenuation of K/N on
the effect of the semi-white box adversarial attack.
Proof. Assuming without loss of generality that SK(x) =
{1, 2, . . . ,K}, the output distortion can be written as ∆SW =
|ZK |, ZK =
∑K
i=1 UiVi, where
Ui =
N∑
m=1
ψi[m]wm, Vi =
N∑
m=1
ψi[m] sgn(wm), i = 1, . . . ,K.
We now state the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The mean and variance of ZK are bounded by
linear functions of K:
E(ZK) = Kµ, var(ZK) ≤ K
(
σ2 + µ2
)
.
Proof. We observe that for i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, E[UiVi] = µ,
var(UiVi) = σ
2 + µ2 − 2µ2
N∑
m=1
ψ4i [m],
cov(UiVi, UjVj) = −2µ2
N∑
m=1
ψ2i [m]ψ
2
j [m], i 6= j.
Hence we get E[ZK ] = Kµ, and
var(ZK) =
K∑
i=1
var(UiVi)−
K∑
i,j=1
i 6=j
cov(UiVi, UjVj)
= K
(
σ2 + µ2
)− 2µ2 N∑
m=1
K∑
i,j=1
ψ2i [m]ψ
2
j [m]
≤ K(σ2 + µ2).
We now apply Chebyshev’s inequality to YK = ZK/K, noting
that E[YK ] = µ and var(YK) ≤
(
σ2 + µ2
)
/K:
Pr(|YK − µ| ≤ δ) ≥ 1− 1
K
(
σ2 + µ2
δ2
)
∀ δ ≥ 0.
The theorem follows by applying the sandwich theorem to the
above inequality as K →∞, observing that |∆SW/K −µ| =
||YK | − µ| ≤ |YK − µ|.
2) White Box Attack
Lemma 2. An upper bound on the white box attack distortion
is given by
∆W ≤
K∑
k=1
∣∣ψTkw∣∣‖ψk‖1.
Proof.
∆W =
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
(
ψTkw
)
ψk[i]
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
∣∣ψTkw∣∣|ψk[i]| = K∑
k=1
∣∣ψTkw∣∣‖ψk‖1.
Remarks.
1. The upper bound is exact if the supports of the K selected
basis functions do not overlap. In our MNIST experiments,
this is approximately satisfied for the range of K that
works most effectively (1-5% of the coefficients in a
wavelet basis).
2. Since the upper bound has K terms, the distortion cannot
grow slower than K. As stated in the following theorem,
however, if the basis functions are “localized” with `1
norms that do not scale too fast with N , then the output
distortion scales as O(K polylog(N)).
Theorem 2. With high probability,
∆W ≤ O(K polylog(N)),
under the assumptions ‖ψk‖1 = O(logN), ‖ψk‖∞ = O(1)
∀ k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, and ‖w‖∞ = O(1). Equivalently,
lim
N→∞
Pr(∆W ≤ O(K polylog(N))) = 1.
Proof. Letting Zk = ψTkw, we first state the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Zk → N (0, σ2) in distribution.
Proof. We show that we can apply Lindeberg’s version of the
central limit theorem, noting that Zk =
∑N
i=1 Yi, where Yi =
ψk[i]wi are independent random variables with E[Yi] = 0 and
var(Yi) = σ
2
i , with
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i = σ
2.
Now, given δ > 0, we investigate the following quantity in
order to check Lindeberg’s condition:
L(δ,N) =
1
σ2
N∑
i=1
E
[
Y 2i 1{|Yi|>δσ}
]
.
From the `∞ assumptions on ψk and w, we observe that
E
[
ψ2k[i]w
2
i 1{|Yi|>δσ}
] ≤ O2(1)O2(1) Pr (|Yi| > δσ)
= O2(1)O2(1) Pr
(
|wi| > δσO(1)
)
.
Also note that ∀ δ > 0, ∃M s.t. ∀N > M , |wi| < δσ/O(1)
∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Hence we get limN→∞ L(δ,N) = 0, which
is Lindeberg’s condition.
From Lemmas 2 and 3, we get
Pr(∆W > δ) ≤ Pr
(
K∑
k=1
|Zk|‖ψk‖1 > δ
)
≤ Pr
(
K⋃
k=1
{
|Zk| > δ
K‖ψk‖1
})
≤
K∑
k=1
Pr
(
|Zk| > δ
K‖ψk‖1
)
=
K∑
k=1
2Q
(
δ
σK‖ψk‖1
)
= 2KQ
(
δ
σ
O
(
1
K logN
))
,
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
e−t
2/2dt, and we have used the `1
assumption on ψk in the last step. The theorem follows by
setting δ = O(K polylog(N)) and applying the sandwich
theorem as N →∞.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we demonstrate the efficacy of sparsifying
front ends on an inference task where our analysis directly
applies: classification of digit pairs from the MNIST hand-
written digit database [10] via linear SVM.1
A. Setup
We consider the task of discriminating between digits d1
and d2, where d1 6= d2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . 9}. The dataset of interest
is X = {x : L(x) ∈ {d1, d2}}, where x denotes the images
normalized to [−1, 1] and L(x) the true labels. We divide X
into training and test sets Xtr,Xte in a 3:1 ratio.
We train a linear SVM classifier f(·) on Xtr and obtain
class predictions C(·) as follows:
f(x) = wTx+ b, C(x) =
{
d1, f(x) < 0
d2, f(x) > 0.
In the scenario without front end, we consider the adversarial
perturbation e =  sgn(w) on Xte, where the “direction” of
the attack is opposite that of the correct class:
x¯ =
{
x+ e, L(x) = d1
x− e, L(x) = d2
∀ x ∈ Xte.
In practice, the adversary usually only has access to C(·) and
not L(·) for the test set. Hence this provides an upper bound
for the classification error.
For the sparsifying front end, we use the
Cohen–Daubechies–Feauveau 9/7 wavelet [11] and impose
sparsity in the wavelet domain. We retrain the SVM with the
sparsified Xtr for various values of ρ = K/N , and evaluate
the impact of semi-white box and white box attacks on Xte.
1Code is available at https://github.com/soorya19/sparsity-based-defenses/.
x
“7”
e = ² sgn(w) x¯ = x+ e
“3”
Fig. 3. Sample image before and after attack ( = 0.25). The adversarial
perturbation causes digit 7 to be misclassified as 3.
B. Results
We begin with 3 vs. 7 classification. Without the front end,
an attack with  = 0.25 completely overwhelms the classifier,
reducing accuracy from 98.20% to 0%. Fig. 3 shows a sample
image before and after attack.
Insertion of the sparsifying front end confers resiliency to
attacks: at low values of ρ, accuracy is restored to near-baseline
levels. The optimal value of ρ must trade off signal distortion
versus perturbation attenuation. We find ρ = 2% to be the best
choice for the 3 versus 7 scenario, and report on the accuracies
obtained in Table I. Results for other digit pairs show a similar
trend. Insertion of the front end greatly improves resilience to
adversarial attacks. The optimal value of ρ lies between 1−5%,
with ρ = 2% working well for all scenarios.
To give a concrete feel of the front end at work, Fig. 4 shows
an example image, the attacked image, and the attacked image
after sparsification.
Fig. 5 reports on accuracy as a function of ρ. At the low
values of ρ that we are interested in, the white box attack is
more damaging than the semi-white box attack. At higher ρ,
a white box attack performs worse than the semi-white box
attack: the high SNR condition in Proposition 1 is no longer
satisfied, hence the white box attack is attacking the “wrong
subspace.” It is easy to devise iterative white box attacks that
do better, but we do not discuss them here because the scenario
of large ρ is not of practical interest, since it does not provide
enough attenuation of the adversarial perturbation.
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TABLE I
BINARY CLASSIFICATION ACCURACIES (3 VS. 7)
No front end Sparsifying front end(ρ = 2%)
No attack 98.20% 98.59%
Semi-white box attack 0% 97.31%
White box attack 0% 94.62%
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Fig. 5. Binary classification accuracies as a function of front end sparsity. All
attacks use  = 0.25. Effectiveness of the front end decreases with increase
in ρ.
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